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 The Politics of International Relations 
Building Bridges and the Quest for Relevance1 
 
AUREL BRAUN 
 
 
 
The 21st Century sadly is proving to be a volatile and violent one where 
the hopes of the immediate years of the post-Cold War era have proven to be 
ephemeral.  International Relations, (IR) at first blush, appears to be ideally 
positioned as a discipline to help us understand or even cope with the extreme 
dissonance of the international system. A discreet academic field for a century 
now, but in fact one of the oldest approaches, IR seems to brim with promise to 
offer explanation, identify causality and enable cogent prediction. 
After all, in an era where we emphasize interdisciplinary studies and 
across-the-board approaches IR appears to be a compelling intellectual 
ecosystem. It has and continues to borrow, incorporate, expropriate and 
integrate from the widest range of fields. Employing multiple levels of analysis 
IR roams from anthropology to technology, from cultural analysis to gender 
studies. Nothing seems to be beyond its scope and includes in its analytic realm 
almost everything from human rights to terrorism and even a new scourge, 
cyber-warfare.  It is, in short, a field that seems to be all about “bridges” that 
would help unity or at least transcend differences. 
The above appearance, or aspiration, unfortunately turns out to be 
deceptive, just as do the hopes of explanation, causality identification and 
prediction that are so crucial to relevance. A more thorough and forthright 
examination of the field reveals considerable segmentation, misunderstanding, 
mis-reading and internecine battles that at times speak more of walls than 
bridges. The centrifugal forces in the field too often turn out to be stronger than 
the centripetal ones, all to the considerable detriment of IR’s need to be both 
illuminating and relevant. 
What I wish to address here, using a broad brush, is not so much the 
state-of-the-field but rather to identify some of the crucial questions that we 
need to ask (perhaps even more than answers) in order to do a kind of stress test 
of the field to gauge which approach or approaches offer the best possibilities 
for efficacy and relevance. Further I wish to look to the possibility of “bridges” 
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  This is the text presented as the Keynote Address at the international conference “SCOPE 
– The Interdisciplinary Vocation of Political Science(s)”, University of Bucharest, 27-29 
June 2014. 
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with a particular emphasis on classical realism. Within this context, I wish to 
note, a suggestion for “bridges” is not an open ended call for unexamined 
amalgamation but rather bridge building that does not abandon standards or 
forego skepticism and one that recognizes the imperative of relevance. In order 
to address at least part of this task I will look at several issue areas.  
 
 
Plus ça change… 
 
In academic terms, IR again is perhaps the oldest profession. We can 
certainly go back two and a half millennia and read with great benefit the 
writings of Thucydides (5th Century), Chanakya (4th Century), or Sun Tzu (6th 
Century). There is understandably though a desire to progress, to formulate new 
ideas and to introduce novel methodologies. This is both natural and desirable. 
The problem is that there is a risk of just trying to reinvent the basic wheel, even 
if in some altered form. Are we looking for a truly new and more effective 
approach then, or a mere “a cult of the new” which leaves us with little 
understanding of the crucial underpinning principles that give a field the 
necessary efficacy and relevance? The latter quest, even if inadvertent or 
unconscious, also creates risks of unhinged abstraction and methodological 
obsession among students and scholars of IR alike. 
We have seen through history the development of IR theories that range 
from meta to mere islands. Realism, and variants competing, with 
liberalism/idealism/liberal internationalism, in the late 20th Century came to be 
joined by social constructivism and a variety of existing and evolving post-
modernist and critical theories. It would take too long to enumerate everything 
that confronts students and scholars, including Marxist dependence theory, the 
Core-Periphery model, various leadership theories  (including the inherent “bad 
faith” model), all in addition to concepts of IR that naturally incorporate power, 
national interest, sovereignty, polarity, interdependence, dependency and so 
forth, at times in a mind-numbing plethora that, wrongly I contend, might 
suggest that anything goes as long as it armed with an appropriate scholarly 
verbiage and/or incorporates seemingly rigorous/scientific methodology.   
The above is precisely why we need to take stock and why it is so 
instructive to go back, at least at times, to the “ancients”. As I noted earlier, 
contributions to the development of IR during the last two and a half millennia 
have come from all the major cultures and it would be a mistake to think of it as 
just Western or Eurocentric. My concentration here on the Western cannon is 
not to suggest superiority but rather I do so because that is the one with which I 
am most familiar. 
Let me start by inviting students and specialists in IR, alike to go back 
(as Simon Critchley rightly has done) to Thucydides and his The History of the 
The Politics of International Relations 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XV  no. 4  2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
559
Peloponnesian War. In particular the Melian Dialogue is central to an 
understanding of IR. It is about the play of power and its intersection with 
discursive practice – in this case an extended and ultimately, (certainly from the 
outcome for the Melians), a tragically failed exercise. In his direct and 
unsentimental historian’s role, Thucydides lays bare the realities of power and 
the dangers of false hope. This does not mean that Thucydides had no normative 
interest but in his acuity in starkly laying out actions, thoughts and discourse he 
is as modern, and frankly more eloquent, than much of the discussion or debate 
on “soft” and “hard” power or on the assessment of how and why power is 
exercised, or the didactic debates on what is “meant” by power 
When we move a couple of millennia forward, we still benefit from the 
thoughts of the “new ancients”, Machiavelli and Hobbes who vividly address 
the issues of power and conflict. Hugo Grotius spoke to the need for peace and 
preventing or at least regulating wars in a strikingly modern legal lexicon. 
Locke, Montesquieu, Clausewitz, Kant and Nietzsche among many others 
remain profoundly relevant, if only we have the drive, patience and the humility 
to read them carefully and receptively. Sadly instead, too often we spend far too 
much time in internecine debates that too easily dismiss, misunderstand or 
misperceive, and different approaches become scholarly solitudes. In all of this 
we lose extremely valuable knowledge and ways of understanding that are 
currently in such urgent need. 
 
 
Internecine Debates 
 
 It may be perhaps instructive thus to touch briefly on what I would 
characterize as a rather fruitless epistemological dance between the “positivists” 
and “post-positivists”. It has been ripe with misreading and misunderstanding. 
The allegation, if not outright accusation, that positivist theories are intent on 
replicating the methods of the natural sciences is both an overstatement and 
misreading. It tends to lump together political realism, neo-realism and 
liberalism when in fact even realism and neo-realism are starkly different. 
Realism attempts a grand theory while at the same time it recognizes its grave 
inherent limitations. Certainly the best proponents such as Hans Morgenthau 
and Raymond Aron made this abundantly clear. Neo-realism, by contrast, 
places an extraordinary emphasis on structure (hence also known as structural 
realism) where, perhaps its most prominent proponent, the late Kenneth Waltz 
would bizarrely argue, based on such structural determinism, that the genocidal 
regime in Tehran, which is driven by a messianic theology of after-world 
salvation, should get nuclear weapons and that this would be a stabilizing 
factor.  
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It is key neo-realists (and not the political realists) who have tried to 
mimic the naturalist conception of science just as it should be increasingly 
evident, that in physics, for instance, certain key physical concepts and theories 
that insisted on exactness have been abandoned or at least modified. Let me 
offer a small example of the perils of the scientific approach in some of the 
work of a respected and well-intentioned scholar, the late J. David Singer, 
author of Quantitative International Politics. In co-founding the Correlates of 
War Project (COW) he attempted to devise a scientific means of finding an 
overarching definition of war. In brief, the definition of war he offered was 
“sustained combat, involving organized armed forces, resulting in a minimum 
of one thousand battle-related fatalities... within a twelve month period”. 
Compare that to movie star John Wayne’s definition: “War is hell”. In an 
informal survey among my students in the past couple of years, over ninety 
percent favoured the John Wayne definition. 
Contrast such an attempt to mimic the “exact” sciences by some key 
neo-realists and others with the approach of the most influential 20th Century 
realist, Hans Morgenthau. A thorough reading of his works, (that in so many 
universities are now out of fashion), reveals not just a humanistic wish for 
international law to succeed while recognizing the current realities of power but 
also the rejection of the fetishism of a “scientific” approach. In particular in his 
essay “Science Man vs Power Politics” Morgenthau strongly rejects the idea 
that politics and power can be studied scientifically. He insists on nuance, the 
art of analysis and that in no way obviate his normative concerns. 
Further, realists such as Morgenthau employed a holistic approach 
where concepts such as responsiveness open vast possibilities for analysis of the 
role of ideas and diplomacy (before constructivists ever talked about ideational 
drives and discursive practices). And the most forthright realists will also 
quickly acknowledge the limits of political realism. Realism is uncertain, it is 
inadequate and it is in certain ways “unreal”. Consequently, what I have offered 
above is not a defense of political realism but rather an invitation to relevance. 
In crucial ways a focused quest for relevance in IR helps theory becomes 
compelling and enduring. 
In order to gauge both the limitations and the potential of political 
realism, particularly in building bridges, we need to have a more accurate 
understanding than the frequent caricature that “progressive” literature in IR 
portrays realism to be. Let us start with Machiavelli. It is true that he replaces 
the traditional virtue which related to certain moral qualities including justice 
and self-restraint, with virtù, which alluded to ability or vigour. At one level it 
may be said that Machiavelli rejected the use of morality in internal and 
external politics. This however, de-contextualizes the thrust of his approach to 
politics. First, even though he justified amoral actions in politics for key 
purposes he did not suggest that such actions were not evil. That recognition of 
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the potential for evil is a crucial identification as well as possible restrain on 
policy makers. Second, and consequently, it is seminal to appreciate that 
Machiavelli offered prudential advice to leaders and he avidly defended the 
republican form of government. For Machiavelli, the suspension of moral 
consideration in politics consequently was not to be a matter of mere 
expediency. Moreover, he never retreated to the extreme forms of what the 
French call raison d'état, and certainly he needs to be distinguished from the 
Hegelian state-worship that led to such extremes, particularly in the 20th 
Century. 
As for Morgenthau, for the second half of the 20th Century and for the 
current millennium, he, again, remains in key respects the most important 
realist. Though again, it has been unfashionable for some time at many 
departments of political science and of IR to teach Morgenthau’s writings he is 
in many quarters becoming relevant again. Yet misunderstandings of what 
Morgenthau advocated, persists. First, we need to appreciate that normativity 
for Morgenthau and likeminded realists was an intrinsic part of political realism. 
Second, for Morgenthau specifically the normative reached for rationality. 
Third, Morgenthau did not suggest some simple separation between politics and 
ethics. It is vital to understand that ethics were not discarded in Morgenthau’s 
principles of realism. Witness his sixth principle of realism where in Hillel-like 
fashion he wrote, “a man who was nothing but ‘political man’ would be a beast, 
for he would be completely lacking in moral restraints. A man who was nothing 
but ‘moral man’ would be a fool, for he would be completely lacking in 
prudence”. Fourth, Morgenthau makes it clear that international peace is not to 
be achieved at the cost of eliminating any of the units in the international 
system. And fifth, Morgenthau also insisted that the quest for power was to be 
driven by an intelligent approach that understood that the pursuit of national 
self-interest, far from being incompatible with that of an international interest in 
peace, worked best in fact in tandem. 
Consequently, even though Morgenthau is viewed as someone who was 
influenced by the theologian Reinhold Niebuhr and of course Hobbes, his 
approach is not incompatible with that of Kant who generally is put in the 
column of the liberal/idealist approach. And this is indeed where there are 
important possibilities for bridges. Kant wrote about perpetual peace and in the 
late 20th Century the best articulated modern iteration of this came from Michael 
Doyle who in many ways is the father of the democratic peace theory that 
retains considerable relevance. In an international system of enlightened 
national self-interest and one committed to the preservation of each unit as a 
prerequisite for peace, balancing is naturally best achieved through the creation 
of a community of democracies (not unlike the way balancing is achieved in the 
domestic systems of democracies). Doyle’s contention that democracies do not 
go to war against other democracies (this is not to suggest that democracies do 
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not go to war with non-democracies) has the potential to open a road to 
effectively meld both realism and hope. 
The realism of Morgenthau in fact can also be seen in the interplay 
between domestic and foreign policy and in certain respects foreshadows 
democratic peace theory. The notion of balancing power as a way to achieve 
crucial goals is evident in democratic politics and Morgenthau was not only 
keenly aware of the central significance of the balancing in the creation of the 
first modern democracy, that of the United States, but wrote glowingly about 
the Framers, particularly James Madison. In fact, modern democracies, if one 
goes back to the Federalist Papers and particularly James Madison’s Federalist 
No. 51 and No.10, are not about the pursuit of virtue but about the protection of 
rights. The Framers recognized contradictory human instincts and frailties and 
the consequent potential for abusing power, and therefore they limited power 
through a system of checks and balances. That goal and mechanism are, in 
essence, at the heart of every modern democracy. The system of checks and 
balances is transferred to the international level in realism and in a sense also in 
democratic peace theory which looks to international balance, at least until the 
entire international system becomes composed of democratic states, at which 
point the balancing mechanism would be endogenous. 
Historically, vast numbers of policy makers have found a balance of 
power system compelling, even if they did not refer to a theory. I can think of 
no better example of a practitioner of classical political realism than the great 
Romanian statesman and diplomat Nicolae Titulescu – even though he might be 
viewed by some as an idealist. Titulescu who, as we know, was Foreign 
Minister of Romania from 1927 to 1928 and beginning in 1921 acted as 
Romania’s permanent representative to the League of Nations (and as the 
League’s president in 1930 and 1931) was a keen observer and practitioner of 
both power and diplomacy. Through skillful use of diplomacy he great raised 
the power and prestige of a relatively small country while keenly aware of 
international limitations. He fought for good relations and respect among all 
states and recognized the dangers of aggression early. Though a realist when it 
came to power, he courageously expressed his normative concerns. In 1936, at 
the League, when Ethiopia’s Emperor Haile Selassie addressed the organization 
following the brutal invasion of his country by fascist Italy, attending Italian 
“journalists” demonstrated racist disrespect for the Ethiopian leader. Titulescu, 
who enjoyed enormous respect in the hall, without hesitation shouted out “a la 
porte les sauvages” (to the door with the savages or, more colloquially, throw 
out the savages). He also understood the intersection of soft and hard power 
better than Western democracies like Britain and France who refused to stand 
up to Mussolini and Titulescu’s warnings proved prophetic. 
Realism nonetheless is usually deemed to be entirely separate from 
liberalism. Is this, however, correct? There are, in fact, congruencies of interest 
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between realists and liberalists (as some of the above would suggest) and there 
is no doubt that realists prefer democracy and value human rights. Realism was 
never about amorality but rather about the limits of what can be achieved in an 
actual world situation. It was not opposed to ideology; rather it rejected and 
feared ideological dogmatism. It is ironic then that some would suggest that 
constructivism is a replacement for realism or even liberalism. Some of the 
advocates of replacement such as Alexander Wendt, possibly the most 
sophisticated constructivist, nonetheless, as Samuel Barkin has noted, concedes 
that at least to the extent that realism is about power, he also considers himself a 
realist. It would then be quite unwise to try to “wall off” realism (and 
liberalism) and no theories can be static and remain relevant. 
 
 
Exaggerated Hopes 
 
The collapse of communism in the Soviet Union (and Eastern Europe) 
gave way to uncharacteristic and premature optimism. Francis Fukuyama, in an 
ironic if not triumphalist fashion, wrote about “the end of history”. He meant by 
this the triumph of the liberal democratic idea but his assessment was also 
imbued with a kind of Hegelian sense of history where the dialectic as a motor 
of development (through counter-posing opposites and reaching synthesis), 
ended. The persistence or at the very least the full blown return of geopolitics as 
Walter Russell Mead has contended recently, belies Fukuyama’s assessment. 
The problem in IR, however is not optimism. After all, the implosion of 
communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and the demise of the 
Soviet state represented a tectonic shift brimming with possibilities. The 
problem was the acuity of the analysis and the difficulty of prediction. Realism 
and liberalism had not adequately predicted or explained this monumental 
change. A “scientific theory” like neo-realism was not up to the task.  Scientific 
methodology did not resolve the dilemmas or conundrums. 
There is, in fact, much to be sceptical about regarding the scientific 
approach and the frequent obsession with methodology rather than relevance. 
This is by no means a suggestion that one should not employ rigorous 
methodology. Students of IR should have strong preparation in quantitative as 
well as qualitative techniques. The problem has been overconfidence or de-
contextualization of methodology that leads at times to a kind of academic 
abstraction that is unhelpful. Some of the quantitative methodologies have 
reached a level of seeming elegance without meaningfulness. They are, to put it 
colloquially, like watching a dog walking on its hind legs. It may look 
impressive but it is quite unnatural. 
Partly as reaction and partly as a natural development in any discipline 
to seek new or better theories and concepts the “reflectivist” critique of the 
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scientific approach has offered different dimensions of understanding and 
analysis and emanates from a variety of directions. These can range from 
Habermas to Derrida and Foucault. As part of this trend, constructivists, at one 
level, (who hold that the international system is socially constructed where the 
interests and identities of the actors derive from “... inter-subjective social 
structures”) brought a new optimism to IR theory in no small measure through 
their efforts to address the problem of normativity. It is always helpful to try to 
fill lacunae. Is it not essential though that in addressing the issues of normativity 
an approach needs to move not only on the level of meta theory but also in 
terms of substantive claims about international politics? Helpfully, 
constructivism does so in certain respects, especially by looking at identity. 
Constructivists such as Ted Hopf even examined the way in which states find 
their identities “in others” when he looked at Russian foreign policy. 
Substantive theoretical claims, however, need to do more than that and cannot 
afford to be unidimensional. True, constructivism did address certain 
substantive problems of wealth and security but there are major questions as to 
how successful it did so, particularly in terms of causality. 
Some constructivists, such as Emanuel Adler have attempted to suggest 
that constructivism is occupying a kind of middle ground between rationalist 
theories ‒ whether realism, neorealism or neoliberal institutionalism ‒ and 
interpretative approaches (such as postmodernism , Frankfurt school-oriented 
critical theories and feminism). At least this appears an attempt at bridging. 
Alexander Wendt, again possibly the most perceptive and sophisticated among 
the constructivist scholars, has sought to pursue an explicit theoretical bridge 
between nation state identity and structural theories of international relation. 
Further, Wendt does not entirely exclude building on realism (though, 
unfortunately, and I would contend mistakenly, at one point he does suggest 
that realism and constructivism are logically incompatible). In particular, I 
believe that he is mistaken in characterizing realist theory as one that sees 
politics having “a material rather than social basis”, thus implying logical 
incompatibility. Morgenthau among other realists, for instance, has forcefully 
contended that nonmaterial factors are vital if we are to fully comprehend 
power. By contrast, some of the more restrictive constructivists again contend 
that constructivism is an alternative to or transcends realism (including, it 
appears, Adler). 
A constructivism that rests on and makes more modest claims can 
indeed be useful and help with bridging rather than building walls. First, 
however, it should not confuse its argument with neo-realism, which is about 
structure, with realism, that is classical realism, which is far more encompassing 
and nuanced. Second, constructivism’s insistence that IR structures are socially 
constructed and that in a kind of interaction these structures shape actors and 
identities and interests rather than just their behaviour is problematic in terms of 
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causality. The latter tends to be far more complex and even in the case of Wendt 
there has been a problem with the direction of causality, I would suggest, 
especially when he looks at the issues of identity formation which he contends 
is based on both natural and cultural selection. Third, by claiming that IR 
structures are socially constructed, constructivism discards a whole range of 
other causal factors which classical realists or others may not be able to readily 
identify, but such an inability is no proof of nonexistence. Fourth, 
constructivism may not adequately appreciate or explain the difference between 
an international system that is anarchic, as illuminated by realists from Hobbes 
to Hedley Bull, where they look at a system that is characterized by self-help 
rather than one which some constructivists view as defined by anarchy, in the 
sense of chaos and confusion. Wendt’s catchy contention that “anarchy is what 
states make of it” unfortunately may not be particularly helpful. Fifth, 
constructivism’s insistence on the ideational has a degree of attractiveness 
because realism definitely does not reject the power of ideas nor does realism 
underplay the role of diplomacy which in modern iterations could certainly fit in 
with the notion of discursive practices. 
Constructivism’s remarkable optimism, however, in its explanatory 
powers and in the justice of its normative goals threatens a break with realist 
(and liberal for that matter) scholarly traditions and easily dismisses realism (at 
least among many of the constructivist scholars) as foundational. Yet current 
developments in the international system raise major questions about the 
efficacy of constructivism, especially if it posits itself as an alternative to 
realism. Constructivism for example has not resolved the problem of dealing 
with what is known as the “security dilemma”. Further, it certainly does not 
sufficiently explicate the problem of identity formation or characterization in 
current crises. Let’s look at a specific example. Here in Bucharest at the NATO 
summit in 2008 Vladimir Putin, the Russian President forebodingly told 
American President George Bush that Ukraine is not even a state. This relates to 
the “other” as identity formation, and may be tangentially ideational, but when 
one looks at the practical implications, namely the current Russian attempt to 
dismantle or entirely absorb Ukraine and deny its identity through a process of 
delegitimization, constructivism’s insistence on the ideational and discursive 
practices doesn’t quite measure up ‒ particularly in comparison to the Kremlin’s 
geopolitical considerations. Does anyone seriously believe that better discursive 
practices would have prevented or would reverse Russian aggression in Ukraine? 
Again, there are certain developments that we may not be able to 
explain in terms of causality or form a theoretical explanation that immediately 
explicates both cause and effect. But that does not mean that we should just 
cling to any explanation. It is at times necessary to reduce over-complexity via a 
kind of Ockham’s razor that gets back to first principles and this is where 
realism and what has been logically constructed on top of it seems compelling. 
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This is where we also perhaps need to display a degree of modesty in terms of 
our claims and recognize the limitations of our capacity at theory formulation, 
be sceptical of various explanations without becoming cynical and try to 
separate that which we know from that which we do not. We need to look at 
issues and crises the way they are and the international system the way it is 
rather than the way we wish them to be. Critchley is right to refer to Nietzsche’s 
cogent advice that in looking at hard factuality we need to have “courage in the 
face of reality”.  
The history of prediction in IR, (at best an art, and certainly not a 
science), is hardly a glorious one. Nonetheless, there are achievements and there 
remains enormous potential. We, however, as scholars, practitioners or 
statesmen, need to display a certain degree of modesty in our claims of what we 
know and what we can achieve. The approach should be holistic and dynamic 
but is not about perfection. Rather IR theorizing is a continuing struggle, where 
we have to ask the right kind of questions before we can hope to attain answers. 
It would also behoove us to have a sense of humour about our field for we have 
witnessed too many miscues, misunderstandings and premature claims of 
success. But possibilities for building bridges remain. Much of what was done 
certainly was done in good faith and it is worth remembering that we haven’t 
always been wrong. 
 
 
